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The Principles of Descartes's Philosophy. BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA. The philosopher's earliest work, translated from the Latin, with an introduction by Halbert Hains Britan, Ph.D. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. 1905. Pp. lxxxi + 177.

This work of Spinoza's contains (1) an attempt to demonstrate certain portions of Descartes's '*Principia Philosophiæ*' (not 'the principles of Descartes's philosophy,' as the translator puts it) *more geometrico*, and (2) an appendix containing certain '*Cogitata Metaphysica*' of Spinoza's. It is prefaced by a lively and illuminating letter to the reader from Ludwig Meyer, to whom Spinoza had entrusted the work of publication. The first 'Part' of the main work is concerned with God, and the second with space, matter and motion; the third is a mere fragment. The sixty-two pages of '*Cogitata Metaphysica*' contain a preliminary discussion of such subjects as being, essence, existence, necessity and eternity, a series of short chapters on the attributes of God, and a few pages at the end on immortality and the freedom of the will.

In these '*Cogitata*' the geometrical method is dropped, but the topics are those of the ethic, and the question we naturally ask is, How far do they express Spinoza's own thought at the time and how far are they mere attempts to interpret Descartes? That Spinoza himself did not regard them as satisfactory expressions of his own thought is evident enough from his explicit statement that he holds 'the exact contrary to much that is there written,' for example, to the doctrine of the freedom of the will, and that the treatise is published in the hope that 'some of those who hold the foremost positions in my country will be found desirous of seeing the rest of my writings, which I acknowledge to be my own,' and make it possible to publish them without breaking the law. What these other writings were Dr. Britan does not tell us.

So much for Spinoza. Dr. Britan's introduction to the translation covers some eighty pages, and would have been much improved if he had condensed it into eight or ten. As to the translation itself, it is extremely slipshod, even where we have the right to expect the most painstaking care. Thus we find this definition at the beginning of Part I:

"VII. Substance, which is the immediate subject of extension, and of accidents, which presupposes forms of extension as figure, position and motion, etc., is called body (*corpus*)."

This is hard to understand; but it would have been clear enough if the translator had not inserted a comma after 'accidents,' and had left 'presuppose' in the plural. The Latin reads, '*extensionis, et accidentium quae extensionem presupponent.*'

So with Definition IX. "When we say that something is contained in the nature of the thing itself or in its concept, it is the same as to affirm that this is true." But true of what? The Latin reads, '*idem est, ac si diceremus, id de ea re verum esse, sive de ipsa posse vere affirmari.*'

Once more, in the discussion of Zeno's argument against motion (p. 73) we read: "For if you reply that a body does not move *in* the place it is, but *from* that place to another, he will ask whether it does not also

move through the intervening places. We reply by making a distinction—if through the term *was* we understand *to be at rest*, then we deny that the body was at any of the places through which it moved: but if by *was* existence is meant, then we say," etc. But where is this ambiguous term '*was*' on which the whole point depends? It ought to be in the clause which reads, 'whether it does not also move through the intervening places' (rogabit: An in locis intermediis non fuit?).

These are rather extreme examples, to be sure, but they do not give an unfair impression of the general character of the translation.

Some authors might be translated in this free and easy way without serious harm, but with Spinoza every word tells, and it is a pity that the translation should be less clean-cut and unambiguous than the original.

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A Reconciliation between Structural and Functional Psychology. MARY WHITON CALKINS. *The Psychological Review*, March, 1906. Pp. 61-81.

Professor Calkins's article is the presidential address at the Cambridge meeting of the American Psychological Association. It includes (1) a defense of the 'conscious self as basal fact in psychology,' (2) a reconciliation, through the offices of this self, of structural and functional psychology and (3) a description of consciousness in terms of structure and of personal relation. The object of the paper is 'to show that the two conceptions, structural and functional, are readily combined if only the basal fact of psychology be conceived as a conscious self, that is, as a self-being-conscious.' The possibility of the 'combination' or 'reconciliation' or 'harmony' of the two conceptions lies in the alleged fact that 'a self-being-conscious is not only analyzable into elements, but is also a complex of relations to its environment, social and physical.'

The most noteworthy feature in the address is the new position taken by the author with regard to the doctrine of 'selves.' In earlier expositions, the 'psychology of selves' has been made coordinate with 'structural' or 'process' psychology. Any mental experience whatsoever, it has been urged, may be treated either as an idea or event 'without any reference at all to any self,' or as an experience of a 'self' or 'ego.'¹ Now, however, Miss Calkins declares that 'in spite of the abstract possibility of conceiving consciousness as a series of ideas and psychology as the science of this stream of ideas, I am none the less convinced that not the idea, but the self, should be taken as the basal fact of psychology.' This conviction is defended in two ways: (1) 'the idea is itself an abstraction which invariably implies a self' and (2) no description in terms of process gives 'a full and adequate account of actual conscious experience.' These defects of process psychology may be eliminated by sub-

¹ Cf. 'An Introduction to Psychology,' 1901, pp. v, 12, 149 ff.; also, 'Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie,' 1905.